



**Australian Government**  
**Australian Commission for  
Law Enforcement Integrity**

# Investigation Report

Operation Adelaide –

An investigation into the misuse of a Commonwealth credit card  
by an Australian Border Force officer

A report to the Attorney-General, prepared under section 54  
of the *Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006* (Cth)

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Investigation Reports published by the Integrity Commissioner  
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# Contents

<b>About ACLEI Reports</b>	<b>4</b>
The Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act	4
The role of the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI	4
Corrupt conduct	4
Dealing with corruption issues	5
Reports	5
Standard of proof	6
<b>Preface to the public version of Investigation Report</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Summary of the Investigation</b>	<b>8</b>
Notification	8
Jurisdiction	8
Investigation	8
<b>Findings</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Action under Part 10 of the LEIC Act</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Corruption Prevention Observation</b>	<b>13</b>

# About ACLEI Reports

## The Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act

1. The *Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006* (Cth) (LEIC Act) establishes the office of Integrity Commissioner, supported by a statutory agency, the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI).

## The role of the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI

2. The role of the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI is to detect and prevent corrupt conduct and deal with corruption issues in designated agencies—presently the:
  - Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (including the former Australian Crime Commission, the former National Crime Authority and the former CrimTrac Agency);
  - Australian Federal Police (including ACT Policing);
  - Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC); and
  - Department of Home Affairs (including the Australian Border Force).
3. Other Australian Government agencies with law enforcement functions may be prescribed by regulation as being within the jurisdiction of the Integrity Commissioner.<sup>1</sup> At present those agencies include prescribed aspects of the:
  - Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment (DAWE)
  - Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)
  - Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA)
  - Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC); and
  - Australian Taxation Office (ATO).

## Corrupt conduct

4. A staff member of a law enforcement agency 'engages in corrupt conduct' if the staff member:
  - abuses his or her office
  - perverts the course of justice, or
  - having regard to his or her duties and powers, engages in corrupt conduct of any other kind.
5. The Integrity Commissioner is to give priority to dealing with serious and systemic corruption.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006* (Cth) s 5(1) (definition of 'law enforcement agency') (LEIC Act); *Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Regulations 2017* (Cth) s 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid* s 6(1).

## Dealing with corruption issues

6. A corruption investigation can commence in different ways:
  - the Minister may refer to the Integrity Commissioner an allegation or information that raises a corruption issue.
  - the head of a law enforcement agency within ACLEI's jurisdiction must notify the Integrity Commissioner of any allegation or information that raises a corruption issue which relates to that agency.
  - any person or government agency can refer to the Integrity Commissioner an allegation or information that raises a corruption issue. A referral may be anonymous, or on behalf of another person.
  - the Integrity Commissioner can commence an investigation on his or her own initiative.<sup>3</sup>
7. The Integrity Commissioner may decide to deal with the corruption issue in a number of ways:
  - have ACLEI investigate the corruption issue either alone or jointly with another government agency or an integrity agency for a State or Territory.
  - refer the corruption issue to the law enforcement agency to conduct its own investigation.
  - decide that an investigation is not warranted.
8. The Integrity Commissioner can decide to manage or oversee any investigation that has been referred to a law enforcement agency. If the law enforcement agency were not the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Integrity Commissioner can also refer the issue to the AFP for investigation and may manage or oversee that investigation.<sup>4</sup>

## Reports

9. After completing a corruption investigation, the Integrity Commissioner must prepare a report setting out:
  - a. the Integrity Commissioner's findings on the corruption issue; and
  - b. the evidence and other material on which those findings are based; and
  - c. any action that the Integrity Commissioner has taken, or proposes to take, under Part 10 in relation to the investigation; and
  - d. any recommendations that the Integrity Commissioner thinks fit to make and, if recommendations are made, the reasons for those recommendations.<sup>5</sup>
10. The Integrity Commissioner must give the report on the investigation to the Minister who administers the LEIC Act and a copy to the head of the law enforcement agency to which the corruption issue relates.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid s 18–24 and 38.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid s 26–30.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid s 54(1)–(2).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid s 55.

## Standard of proof

11. The Integrity Commissioner makes findings about whether a person has engaged in corrupt conduct, based on the balance of probabilities. Those findings may not be the same as those that would be made by a court deciding on criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
12. Before making a finding, the Integrity Commissioner is required to be 'reasonably satisfied', based on relevant facts, that the corrupt conduct occurred and that the corrupt conduct was within the meaning of the LEIC Act.
13. In considering whether or not the Integrity Commissioner is 'reasonably satisfied' of relevant facts, the Integrity Commissioner applies the reasoning set out in *Briginshaw v Briginshaw*,<sup>7</sup> *Rejtek v McElroy*,<sup>8</sup> and *Re Day*.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> (1938) 60 CLR 336, 361–62 (Dixon J).

<sup>8</sup> (1965) 112 CLR 517, 521.

<sup>9</sup> (2017) 91 ALJR 262, 268 [14]–[18].

# Preface to the public version of Investigation Report

14. This investigation report is a report on Operation Adelaide, a corruption investigation into the misuse of a Commonwealth credit card issued to an Australian Border Force (ABF) officer in the course of their employment.
15. Operation Adelaide commenced on 8 June 2017 and found that an ABF officer, Mr Pablo Olivares, had engaged in corrupt conduct by abusing his office when he:
  - a. withdrew cash from the Commonwealth credit card totalling \$65,880.00;
  - b. forged statutory declarations in an attempt to substantiate charges to the Commonwealth credit card;
  - c. paid for hotel bookings around Brisbane on the Commonwealth credit card totalling \$27,640.89;
  - d. paid for car rentals on the Commonwealth credit card totalling \$377.86; and
  - e. forged medical certificates and submitted them to his employer to obtain paid leave for which he was not entitled.
16. The investigation resulted in Mr Olivares pleading guilty to three counts of theft under s 131.1(1) of the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth) (Criminal Code) and two counts of using forged documents under s 145.1(1) of the Criminal Code.
17. On 23 August 2021, Mr Olivares was convicted and sentenced to 2.5 years imprisonment, to be released after 5 months served conditional on entering a recognisance of \$1,000 and being of good behaviour for a period of 3 years. A reparation order in the amount of \$93,898.75 was also made.
18. Following this, I prepared my investigation report on Operation Adelaide pursuant to s 54 of the LEIC Act and undertook a procedural fairness process as required by s 51. I made a corruption finding in relation to Mr Olivares that he engaged in corrupt conduct, by abusing his office, as defined in s 6(1)(a) of the LEIC Act.
19. On 8 November 2021, I gave the Attorney-General and the Secretary of Home Affairs my finalised investigation report on Operation Adelaide in accordance with s 55 of the LEIC Act.
20. I then considered whether it was in the public interest to publish the investigation report on Operation Adelaide under s 209 of the LEIC Act.
21. On 17 November 2021, I notified the Secretary for Home Affairs and Mr Olivares that I was considering publishing the investigation report on Operation Adelaide, giving the opportunity to provide submissions on the proposed publication in accordance with s 210 of the LEIC Act. The process concluded on 8 December 2021 with submissions from the Secretary for Home Affairs.
22. This is the version of the investigation report I have decided is in the public interest to disclose.



Jaala Hinchcliffe  
Integrity Commissioner  
23 December 2021

# Summary of the Investigation

## Notification

23. On 8 June 2017, the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection (now Department of Home Affairs) (Home Affairs) notified the former Integrity Commissioner of a significant corruption issue under s 19(1) of the LEIC Act.
24. It was alleged that an Australian Border Force (ABF) Officer, Mr Pablo Olivares, used his Commonwealth credit card to make unauthorised cash withdrawals in March 2017. At that stage, the withdrawals were estimated at \$9,000.

## Jurisdiction

25. On 16 June 2017, the former Integrity Commissioner, Mr Michael Griffin AM, referred this matter to Home Affairs pursuant to s 26(1)(b)(iii) of the LEIC Act for investigation with ACLEI neither managing, nor overseeing the investigation.
26. Following receipt of further information from Home Affairs, on 21 May 2018 the former Integrity Commissioner reconsidered how to deal with the matter pursuant to s 42 of the LEIC Act and decided to investigate the matter jointly with Home Affairs pursuant to s 26(1)(a) and (2). The joint investigation was named 'Operation Adelaide'.
27. The former Integrity Commissioner was satisfied:
  - a. Mr Olivares was an ABF officer, being a 'staff member of a law enforcement agency' as defined at s 10(2A) of the LEIC Act;<sup>10</sup> and
  - b. The information raised a 'corruption issue' as defined by s 7 of the LEIC Act as it was alleged that Mr Olivares fraudulently used his Commonwealth credit card on multiple occasions. The former Integrity Commissioner was satisfied the information indicated that a staff member of a law enforcement agency may have 'engaged in corrupt conduct' pursuant to s 6 of the LEIC Act.

## Investigation

28. At the time of the conduct, Mr Olivares was an ABF officer in the Field Operations and Removals Section of ABF Enforcement Command located in Brisbane, Queensland.<sup>11</sup>
29. On 25 October 2015, Mr Olivares began his role in the Removals team. As part of this role, Mr Olivares was eligible to apply for the use of a Commonwealth credit card to perform his duties.
30. On 26 October 2015, Mr Olivares applied for a Commonwealth credit card and was allocated a Diners Club Commonwealth credit card ending in 6498 (ABF credit card). In a Commonwealth Credit Card Cardholder Agreement Form dated 2 November 2015, Mr Olivares acknowledged certain conditions which governed the use of the ABF credit card, including:

<sup>10</sup> ABF officers who are APS employees are considered staff members of the (former) 'Immigration and Border Protection Department' for the purposes of the LEIC Act.

<sup>11</sup> The Field Operations and Removal Section is responsible for locating, detaining and removing person of interest from Australia under the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). A person may be of interest if they are an unlawful non-citizen or if they hold a visa liable for cancellation.

- a. the ABF credit card is not to be used for anything other than official purposes;
  - b. the ABF credit card is not to be used for private expenditure unless specifically authorised to do so;
  - c. a TRIM file is to be maintained to record all purchases made by the ABF credit card and a copy of all tax invoices and supporting documentation will be retained for recording and audit purposes. If an invoice / receipt is not issued or lost, a statutory declaration is to be completed in its place; and
  - d. if the ABF credit card is lost, stolen or used without authority, the card provider is to be immediately contacted and notified and an email is to be sent to the Commonwealth credit card team.
31. Mr Olivares also acknowledged that if the ABF credit card is used in a fraudulent matter or for an illegal purpose, proceedings may be instituted and wilful non-compliance may lead to disciplinary action and / or criminal investigation.
  32. In early 2016, Mr Olivares was out-posted to a position at Brisbane Immigration and Transit Accommodation (BITA) in Pinkenba, Queensland. In June 2016, Mr Olivares requested that his supervisor in the Removals Team allow his monthly ABF credit card expenditure to be acquitted by the ABF Superintendent at BITA. This request was granted.
  33. On 23 January 2017, Mr Olivares transferred into the Field Operations team. There was no requirement for a member of the Field Operations team to withdraw cash, book flights or accommodation as part of their duties.
  34. On 15 May 2017, Mr Olivares returned to the Removals team.
  35. On 5 June 2017, Mr Olivares' supervisor received an email from a member of Home Affairs' Commonwealth credit card team raising concerns with Mr Olivares' ABF credit card. As a result, Mr Olivares' supervisor conducted a reconciliation of the ABF credit card for the month of March 2017. Mr Olivares' supervisor identified suspicious transactions and over the coming days prepared a spreadsheet recording the details of the reconciliation. This included a check of Mr Olivares' desk for any additional documentation which might assist the reconciliation.
  36. On 8 June 2017, Home Affairs notified the then Integrity Commissioner of a significant corruption issue under s 19(1) of the LEIC Act.
  37. Mr Olivares had taken extended personal leave in June 2017 and was only sporadically in the office. On 12 June 2017, Mr Olivares' supervisor met with Mr Olivares and discussed Mr Olivares' health and attendance, including outstanding leave requests.
  38. On 22 June 2017, Mr Olivares' supervisor and another staff member held a meeting with Mr Olivares. Mr Olivares was informed at that meeting that he was suspended from duty. Mr Olivares returned various work items including an ABF issued iPhone and building passes. Mr Olivares could not produce the ABF credit card.
  39. On 20 October 2017, Mr Olivares formally resigned from the ABF.
  40. Home Affairs and ACLEI investigators held a recorded interview with Mr Olivares on 28 June 2018. While Mr Olivares commenced the interview, Mr Olivares declined to continue the interview after discussing hotel bookings in order to seek legal advice.
  41. The investigation identified activity by Mr Olivares between 5 July 2016 and 12 June 2017 which were not a legitimate part of Mr Olivares' duties or role as an ABF officer, including:

- a. withdrawing cash from the ABF credit card totalling \$65,880.00;
- b. paying for hotel bookings on the ABF credit card totalling \$27,640.89;
- c. paying for car rentals on the ABF credit card totalling \$377.86;
- d. forging medical certificates for periods of sick leave; and
- e. forging statutory declarations to substantiate charges to the ABF credit card.

#### **Cash withdrawals on ABF credit card**

- 42. As part of the removal process, a removal plan is prepared by the ABF Removals officer. A removal plan might include seeking approval from a supervisor to provide a person of interest (the Removee) with Post Removal Support (PRS) to cover the Removee's immediate needs on arrival in their destination country. PRS can include temporary accommodation, onwards domestic travel, excessive baggage costs and meals. If approved, the responsible ABF Removals officer will use their Commonwealth credit card to make any necessary accommodation bookings and / or withdraw the approved sum of PRS cash from an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM). The ABF Removals officer will then provide the PRS cash to the Removee who is required to sign a PRS acknowledgement receipt. The acknowledgement receipt is counter-signed by either a member of security staff or another ABF officer.
- 43. Following the provision of PRS, the ABF Removals officer is then required to file documents in support of the expenditure in the ABF records management database known as "TRIM". The three documents required to be retained for PRS are:
  - a. the PRS approval email;
  - b. the ATM withdrawal slip; and
  - c. the signed PRS acknowledgement receipt.
- 44. At the end of each month, the ABF Removals officer is required to acquit their allocated Commonwealth credit card's statement through ABF's internal management system known as "SAP".
- 45. 134 unauthorised cash withdrawals were made by Mr Olivares between 31 July 2016 and 5 June 2017. The withdrawals were for amounts between \$100 and \$1,200 and totalled \$65,880.00.
- 46. The investigation revealed that Mr Olivares submitted false PRS acknowledgement receipts allocating cash withdrawals to legitimate Removees who had been approved to receive PRS funds. Mr Olivares also submitted false PRS acknowledgement receipts for Removees who were not approved to receive PRS funds. Mr Olivares uploaded the falsified documents to TRIM and submitted them to SAP as supporting documentation for his monthly ABF credit card acquittal.
- 47. Over the relevant period of offending, Mr Olivares was able to avoid detection by uploading false PRS documentation to TRIM and SAP. One month prior to the first unauthorised cash withdrawal, Mr Olivares' supervisor had approved a request made by Mr Olivares for another ABF officer to acquit the ABF credit card expenditure.

#### **Hotel bookings on ABF credit card**

- 48. Between 30 January 2017 and 21 May 2017, Mr Olivares used the ABF credit card on 35 occasions to pay for hotel rooms in various locations around Brisbane,

Queensland. The hotel charges were for amounts between \$100 and \$1,674 and totalled \$27,640.89 for the period.

49. A review of Mr Olivares' ABF email address showed Mr Olivares received various booking confirmations throughout the relevant period. Mr Olivares also corresponded with hotel staff regarding his stays at the hotels on his ABF email address. Guest registrations and booking confirmation was also provided by the various hotels that Mr Olivares stayed at during the period.
50. There was no legitimate reason connected with his employment for Mr Olivares to have booked the hotels and Mr Olivares was not authorised to pay for these hotel bookings on his ABF credit card.

#### **Car rental bookings on ABF credit card**

51. On 5 June 2017, Mr Olivares prepaid \$742.47 for the use of a transit van through a car rental company on his ABF credit card. Mr Olivares used the transit van between 4 June 2017 and 6 June 2017 and on 8 June 2017, Mr Olivares received a refund of \$364.64. The amount appropriated by Mr Olivares on the ABF credit card was \$377.86.
52. There was no legitimate reason connected with his employment for Mr Olivares to have rented a transit van. Mr Olivares was not authorised to pay for the car rental booking on his ABF credit card.

#### **Medical certificates**

53. Mr Olivares uploaded to TRIM 13 false medical certificates covering periods of sick leave between 5 July 2016 and 20 June 2017. These medical certificates were purportedly completed by a doctor of a local medical centre and a medical specialist.
54. The local medical centre confirmed Mr Olivares' last record of attendance was in 2015 and no medical certificates were issued to Mr Olivares in 2016 or 2017.
55. The medical specialist confirmed they had never treated Mr Olivares and the signature on the medical certificate provided by Mr Olivares was not their signature.
56. Mr Olivares' supervisors accepted the false medical certificates as legitimate and subsequently approved leave requests made by Mr Olivares in the relevant period. Mr Olivares subsequently admitted to these 13 medical certificates being forged.

#### **Statutory Declarations**

57. Mr Olivares submitted two statutory declarations in support of charges made to the ABF credit card. These were uploaded to TRIM and submitted via SAP as supporting documentation for the ABF credit card acquittals.
58. The statutory declarations were purported to be signed and witnessed by an ABF officer who was a colleague of Mr Olivares. Mr Olivares' colleague had no recollection of counter-signing the statutory declarations. Mr Olivares' colleague also confirmed that the signature was not theirs and the handwriting was different from their own. Mr Olivares subsequently admitted to these two statutory declarations being forged.

#### **Totality of offending and subsequent conviction**

59. The total deficiency in relation to the misuse of the ABF credit card was \$93,898.75.

60. The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) charged Mr Olivares with 5 offences under the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth) (Criminal Code) including:

#	Period of offending	Offence	Offence provision
1	Between 31 July 2016 and 5 June 2017	Theft	131.1(1) Criminal Code
2	Between 30 January 2017 and 21 May 2017	Theft	131.1(1) Criminal Code
3	Between 31 May 2017 and 8 June 2017	Theft	131.1(1) Criminal Code
4	Between about 5 July 2016 and about 20 June 2017	Use forged document	145.1(1) Criminal Code
5	Between about 15 August 2016 and about 9 December 2016	Use forged document	145.1(1) Criminal Code

61. Mr Olivares pled guilty to all five charges.
62. On 23 August 2021, Mr Olivares was convicted and sentenced to 2.5 years imprisonment, to be released after 5 months served conditional on entering a recognisance of \$1,000 and being of good behaviour for a period of 3 years. A reparation order in the amount of \$93,898.75 was also made.

## Findings

63. I have reviewed the material obtained through this investigation and I am reasonably satisfied that Mr Olivares engaged in conduct in his capacity as an ABF officer that amounted to an abuse of his office.
64. Firstly, Mr Olivares engaged in an improper act in the exercise of his duties as an employee of ABF when he withdrew cash from the ABF credit card totalling \$65,880.00. I find that Mr Olivares was aware that this conduct was improper, or ought to have been aware, given that he acknowledged conditions that the ABF credit card is not to be used for private expenditure. I am reasonably satisfied that Mr Olivares dishonestly obtained a significant financial benefit for himself totalling \$65,880.00 during the relevant period.
65. Relevantly to the withdrawal of cash, Mr Olivares' forging of statutory declarations to substantiate charges to the ABF credit card strongly indicates that he had an awareness that withdrawing cash for his personal use was an improper act. I find that Mr Olivares forged the statutory declarations to avoid detection and, as a result, I am also reasonably satisfied he did so with the intention of being able to continue to obtain a financial benefit for himself as he continued to withdraw cash from the ABF credit card.
66. Further, I am reasonably satisfied Mr Olivares engaged in an improper act in the exercise of his duties when he paid for hotel bookings around Brisbane on the ABF credit card totalling \$27,640.89. Mr Olivares was aware that this conduct was

improper, or ought to have been, given the clear conditions he acknowledged on receipt of the ABF credit card. I am reasonably satisfied that Mr Olivares dishonestly obtained a benefit for himself as he was able to benefit from residing in hotels around Brisbane that he did not personally pay for.

67. Mr Olivares also engaged in an improper act in the exercise of his duties when he paid for car rentals on the ABF credit card totalling \$377.86. Mr Olivares was aware, or ought to have been aware, that the conduct was improper. I am reasonably satisfied that in engaging in this conduct he did so with the intention of dishonestly obtaining a benefit for himself as he was able to rent a car that he did not personally pay for.
68. Finally, Mr Olivares engaged in an improper act in the exercise of his duties when he forged medical certificates and submitted them to his employer for approval. I am reasonably satisfied that in engaging in this conduct he had the intention of dishonestly obtaining a benefit for himself as he was able to be paid while taking leave for which he would not have been otherwise entitled.
69. Accordingly, I find that Mr Olivares engaged in corrupt conduct, by abusing his office, as defined in s 6(1)(a) of the LEIC Act. I am reasonably satisfied that in his capacity as an ABF officer, and in his conduct as outlined above, Mr Olivares engaged in conduct that was a clear abuse of his office.

## Action under Part 10 of the LEIC Act

70. As this investigation was conducted jointly with Home Affairs, Home Affairs also holds the evidence in this matter. Accordingly, no action was required under Part 10 of the LEIC Act.

## Corruption Prevention Observation

71. The conduct investigated in this matter gives rise to a number of well-known corruption risks. This includes the use of Commonwealth credit cards (CCCs), out-posted roles and the identification and management of behavioural 'red flags'.

### Use of Commonwealth Credit Cards

72. Officials with direct and immediate access to government funds via CCCs are in a privileged and trusted position. It is therefore critical that the controls surrounding Commonwealth credit card expenditure are fit for purpose and consistently implemented. At the time of the offending, Home Affairs had implemented the following controls:
  - a. A detailed application process that included mandatory online training, prior to the provision of a CCC.
  - b. An established recording, approval and acquittals process in relation to each expense, which included the review of a number of centrally recorded supporting documents.
73. In spite of the above, Mr Olivares was able to use his Commonwealth credit card for a large amount of unauthorised expenditure over a 12 month period. This occurred even though he:

- a. Submitted a number of forged documents that pertained to duplicate payments.
  - b. Had spent significantly more than would be expected for the number of Removees he was tasked with.
  - c. Stopped working in a role that required him to use a CCC.
  - d. Went on extended periods of leave and had not reconciled his CCC for a number of consecutive months.
74. I note that since this investigation, Home Affairs have implemented a number of new and/or modified credit card fraud mitigation strategies, which are summarised below:
- a. Since late 2017, Home Affairs has changed the process for how the removal teams obtain cash to provide to Removees relating to PRS. Instead of using a credit card to withdraw cash, Cash Advance Accounts are being used. Each account has a nominated account holder and approver, and the holder is required to send monthly reconciliations to the Treasury and Banking Team for review.
  - b. Removal Officers obtain cash from their Cash Advance Account holder and provide them with relevant supporting documentation in line with standard operating procedures.
  - c. Cash withdrawal using a credit card is only used as a backup, primarily for urgent and unforeseen removals. As a result of the above changes, the cash withdrawal amount on credit cards has reduced significantly.
  - d. In addition to the above, in 2019-20 Home Affairs implemented a Credit Card Compliance Monitoring Program. This is a risk-based program aimed at identifying instances of non-compliance (including fraud) with legislation, the Accountable Authority Instructions and the Credit Card Policy.
  - e. Home Affairs Corporate Credit Cards Team (CCCT) also now carries out a number of fraud control measures. These include:
    - i. An annual review to ensure those with cash withdrawal access continue to require the facility on their credit card.
    - ii. Reviewing all cash withdrawals on a monthly basis to ensure the transactions are verified and supporting documents are properly stored.
    - iii. Following up with all cardholders who have outstanding statements for more than 30 days. Cards outstanding without a valid reason are suspended, after a maximum of 60 days.

### **Out-Posted Roles**

75. Officials working in out-posted positions might be more vulnerable to corruption, particularly when their immediate supervisors are not based in the same location – as this matter demonstrates. In these circumstances supervisors must ensure that they have adequate oversight of these staff so that they are held accountable for the work they are expected to undertake, as well as their integrity obligations. It is also imperative that supervisors ensure out-posted staff have access to support when they experience problems that relate to, or impact upon their work.
76. In view of the above, Home Affairs may wish to consider whether supervisors are aware of the potential corruption risks related to managing out-posted staff. ACLEI's Factsheet on Frontline Managers contains a range of recommendations for

agencies to consider, to ensure that supervisors understand their role in preventing corruption and have access to appropriate support mechanisms.<sup>12</sup>

77. Home Affairs may also wish to consider if and how tailored integrity controls could be applied for out-posted positions. This might include bespoke integrity training that addresses corruption risks specific to the out-posted location or ad-hoc audits of CCC expenditure. Carefully selected site leaders could also be established, so that staff who work remotely from their supervisors still have access to local support.

### **Behavioural 'red-flags'**

78. Aside from the relevance in terms of CCC controls, Mr Olivares frequent personal leave in combination with his unusual credit card expenditure could also have been viewed as behavioural 'red-flags'. That is, behaviours that are either inconsistent with official duties, or which may otherwise impact upon them. In these circumstances and when taken as a whole, consideration should be given as to whether there might be underlying risks, and what mitigations should be put in place to support the staff member and prevent corrupt conduct. This process is often referred to as early intervention (EI).<sup>13</sup> In view of the number of indicators of corruption risks in this case, Home Affairs may wish to review its current early intervention framework; in particular with respect to out-posted officers.
79. Further information on early intervention, the role of frontline managers in preventing and identifying corrupt conduct, and on corruption risks and prevention opportunities is available in the Corruption Prevention pages of the ACLEI website (<https://www.aclei.gov.au/corruption-prevention>).



Jaala Hinchcliffe  
Integrity Commissioner

8 November 2021

<sup>12</sup> ACLEI, Corruption Prevention Concepts: Frontline Management Capability (March 2020).

<sup>13</sup> See also, ACLEI, Key Concepts: What is the best approach to early intervention?